January - December 1863

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In spite of the dampness and chill, life in winter quarters during January 1863 was most pleasant for the Texans in Lee's Army. Except for an occasional scouting assignment, foraging for food, or picket duty along the Rappahannock, the men did little more than engage in routine camp duties. These duties included roll call, drill, dress parade, preparing meals, and policing the camp. The ease of army life at this time was reflected in the name given to the camp by the Texas Brigade -- ``Camp Hope.'' 

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During their stay around Fredericksburg, the Texans added to their reputation as experts in the unauthorized procurement of life's ``necessities.'' Although a direct rail line existed between the Army of Northern Virginia and the commissaries in Richmond, the Texans craved a little variety in the daily issue of beef, bacon, and biscuits. Rabbits, guinea hens, chickens, and shoats were particularly popular among the foragers. Chickens and pigs, being domesticated, were relatively easy to procure, but appropriation of these palate pleasers had to be done stealthily. Generals Hood and Lee soon received complaints from the region's civilians about the depredations of the Texans. When hearing Gen. Hood's defense of the Texans, Lee responded, ``Oh, General Hood, when you Texans come about, the chickens have to roost mighty high.'' 

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One irate farmer stamped into the tent of one of Hood's regimental commanders demanding that he discipline the men that had shot and taken one of his largest hogs. ``I heard a shot, followed by a loud squeal,'' related the farmer, ``and when I went out on the porch to investigate I noticed two soldiers carrying the hog away and they were headed for this area.'' When the colonel asked the man if he was sure that he heard a shot and then a squeal, the farmer responded affirmatively. The colonel then informed the farmer that he must be in the wrong camp, ``for when a Texan shoots a hog he don't squeal.'' 

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Gambling was another favorite pasttime among the men in Lee's Army, and again the Texans developed a formidable reputation. The Fourth Texas was the spawning ground for the most successful poker player's in Hood's Division. One evening, a particularly successful Texan was leading a horse he had won from one of Gen. Stuart's cavalrymen down the line to his regiment. As he passed by Bill George of Company B, Fourth Texas, George offered him $1000 for the horse. The poker player responded, ``You are a fool. I've just paid $1800 to get him curried.'' 

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Throughout the day and night of January 28, a heavy snow fell in the Rappahannock Valley and settled into drifts up to several feet deep. At mid-morning of January 29, a large group of First and Fourth Texans pelted the huts of their neighbors, the Fifth Texas with ice balls made from tightly packed wet snow. The outnumbered Fifth Texas managed to drive their assailants back into their camps. There the unified Texans planned a snowball attack on the unsuspecting Third Arkansas. The Arkansans were caught unaware and quickly surrendered their entire encampment to the Texans. Inspired by their success, the Arkansans joined the Texans and plotted to attack the camp of Gen. ``Tige'' Anderson's Georgia Brigade, situated on a hill three-quarters of a mile away across the Massaponax stream. With haversacks full of snowballs, officers in front, battleflags unfurled, and drums and bugles sounding, the 1500-man Texas Brigade moved against the Georgians. 

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The Georgians, forewarned of the impending attack, were ready for the fray. The battle up and down the hillside raged for over an hour. Groans were heard as rocks disguised as snowballs hit their marks. Finally, the Georgians, with both superior numbers and position, drove back the Texans and Arkansans. The Texas Brigade, boosted by reinforcements, rallied and drove the Georgians into their camps, where they gallantly surrendered their forces. The two brigades then combined forces to march against Gen. Lafayette McLaws' Division. Soon 9000 veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia were engaged in a snowball battle royal. Thousands of snowballs were tossed back and forth. At the close of the prolonged struggle, Hood's Division emerged victorious. Thus ended the ``Great Snowball Fight of 1863.'' 

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The Confederate high command was not pleased with the outing. Although only two men were severely injured during the fracas (no doubt the victims of rock-centered snowballs), many soldiers were temporarily laid up with ``black eyes, bloody noses, ragged ears and sadly disfigured physiognomies.'' More important, the noise and mass movement during the fight had caused quite a commotion in the Federal camps across the Rappahannock. Union cavalry, fearing an attack, had become active along the river. Shortly after the fight, Gen. Longstreet issued an order ``prohibiting general snowballing'' in his corps.

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The Great Snowball Fight of 1863 was not the only activity that attracted the attention of the Federals during the winter of 1863. Being separated by a river only a few hundred feet wide, pickets from both armies routinely engaged in conversation and arranged ``no firing'' truces among themselves. These friendly arrangements soon led to the illicit trading of tobacco and coffee. Trading was primarily done through the use of small boats, but the men would occasionally ferry themselves across the river to barter in person. The regimental bands on one side of the Rappahannock would often serenade the troops posted on the other bank. Occasionally the musicians of both sides would combine their talents and give a joint rendition of ``Home, Sweet Home.'' 

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The relatively tranquillity of army life along the Rappahannock was broken on February 15, when General Lee received orders from Secretary of War John Seddon to prepare troops for possible reinforcement of the Richmond defenses. This order was in response to the dispatch of the Federal Ninth Corps to Newport News on the Peninsula. To stave off the potential threat to the capital, Lee ordered Hood's and Pickett's Divisions to Hanover Junction, twenty miles north of Richmond. Pickett's Division was to move immediately, followed by Hood's command. 

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The Texas Brigade under Gen. Jerome B. Robertson left its winter quarters on February 17 and at 5 pm headed south in the midst of a raging blizzard. The roads were a quagmire of frozen mud and slush, and the streams were swollen to several times their normal size. On February 18, Lee received more alarming news about Federal movements and dispatched Gen. Longstreet himself to take command of the two marching divisions. Hood was ordered to march to Atlee's Station, eight miles north of Richmond, where he would await supplies and further orders. The march toward Richmond was one of the hardest yet endured by the Texas Brigade. Many men straggled; others fell by the roadside and slept in the mud. Pvt. J. M. Polk of the Fourth Texas later wrote, ``Snow fell during the entire march to Richmond,'' and ``some of the men were almost barefooted and as they traveled they left blood in their tracks.'' 

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On February 21, the Texas Brigade entered the environs of Richmond after a total march of 69 miles through snow and rain. Being the first troops seen in Richmond since the battles of Second Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, Longstreet's men received a tumultuous welcome. The Texas Brigade put on quite a show for the citizens as they marched through the city. The bands of the Fourth Texas and Third Arkansas led Robertson's rowdy men down Broad Street to the tunes of ``Dixie'' and the ``Marseillaise Hymn.'' The Texans bantered with spectators as they passed and made sport of the ladies wearing large hats by requesting that they ``get down out of them hats.'' 

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The Texas Brigade marched through the capital, crossed the lower (Mayo's) bridge over the James River, and continued south for three miles. Here Robertson's men bivouacked in snow 18 inches deep for several days. It was the first time the Texans had camped south of the James. On February 27, the brigade was ordered several miles farther south to Falling Creek. The men camped on the south bank of the creek about 100 yards from the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. Every day, two officers and two men from Hood's regiments were permitted to visit Richmond. ``Hood's Division,'' wrote one citizen, ``vomiting forth a motley crew into the streets of what was once the pride and boast of Virginia.'' Men who remained in camp often robbed nearby civilians.

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Being camped 100 yards from the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, the Texas Brigade enjoyed easy access to both the streets of Richmond and the Confederate supply depots. Nevertheless, hats were always in short supply. Their bareheaded condition caused the men great consternation, as a good hat was almost as important to an infantryman as his rifle. Being creative foragers, the Texans devised a scheme to net them the necessary headgear. Those needing hats cut long pine switches and laid them alongside the tracks of the Richmond and Petersburg. The hatless Texans and Arkansans hid themselves amidst the brush and pines of the steep railroad embankment. As trains full of politicians and contractors slowly approached their position, the hidden men fired their muskets and sounded the Rebel Yell. The startled passengers raised the windows of the cars and stuck out their heads to see what all the commotion was about. When the greatest number of heads protruded from the windows, the soldiers sprang from their positions with switches in hand and began knocking off hats from the heads of the unsuspecting passengers. Seizing the grounded headgear, the men quickly dashed down the tracks toward their camps. This ambush was staged several times until much of the brigade was outfitted with fine civilian hats and until a guard detail was stationed at the site of the crimes. 

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As in the winter of 1861--1862, officers and men from the companies of the Texas Brigade were detached back to their home counties in search of men to fill the depleted ranks. As of March 9, 1863, the strength of the Texas Brigade was 3030 men, only half of which were fit and present for duty. Unlike the previous winter however, the recruiting drives were not successful. The number of available men back home had dwindled considerably, and those whose remained were not eager to participate in the bloodbaths that Civil War battles usually produced. When Lt. Tom Selman and Pvts. Sam Billingsley and Dave Deckard of Co. E, Fourth Texas returned from McLennan County, they brought with them just one new man, John C. West of Waco -- ``a Texan in search of a fight.'' Although manpower was not forthcoming, support for the men fighting in Virginia was still strong. On March 10, the Ladies Aid Society of Austin donated their $925.30 profit from a recent tableaux to the Texas Brigade. With the inflated prices of goods in the Richmond area, that sum would hardly buy a cup of coffee per man. 

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On March 16, Gen. Longstreet received word from Gen. Lee that Maj. Gen. Joe Hooker, who was now commanding the Union Army of the Potomac, appeared ready to move south across the Rappahannock. Lee wanted Hood's men alerted for a return to the Fredericksburg area. When Federal cavalry crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on March 17, Lee requested the return of Hood's Division. On March 18, the Texas Brigade struck their tents and forced marched northward along the Richmond and Petersburg. A mile below Richmond, Hood foolishly informed the men that they were to rejoin Lee, then cautioned them not to spread the word. Advancing quickly through Richmond, the brigade left the city on the Brook Turnpike and headed toward Ashland. As they marched through Richmond, diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut noted that the men had poor footwear and had ``tin pans and pots tied to their waists, bread and bacon stuck on the ends of their bayonets [and] anything that could be spiked was bayoneted and held aloft.'' 

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The men marched all day on March 18 under threatening skies. When the van of the column was within a few miles of Ashland, the orders to join Lee were cancelled. That night, the troops bivouacked along the turnpike and suffered through a cold, driving blizzard. On March 19, the Texans shook the snow from their thin blankets and headed back toward Richmond. As they passed through the city, the men flocked to the bars that lined Broad Street. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson, commanding the Texas Brigade, reacted angrily to his ever-thinning column before being calmed by Gen. Hood himself. Hood reportedly said to Robertson, ``Let 'em go, General -- let 'em go; they deserve a little indulgence, and you'll get them back in time for the next battle.'' On March 20, a cold, wet, and bedaggled Texas Brigade arrived back at its recently abandoned camp along Falling Creek. Here it remained for the remainder of the month.

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When it became clear that a Federal advance on Richmond from the southeast was not planned, Gen. Lee changed the mission of Gen. Longstreet's two divisions posted south of the James. Hood's and Pickett's men were now to join Confederate forces in southern Virginia and pin down the Federal garrison at Suffolk, Virginia, near the Great Dismal Swamp. Afterwards, Longstreet's men were to relieve Lee's supply crisis on the Rappahannock by conducting a grand foraging expedition in the relatively untouched farm land west and south of Suffolk. 

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On April 2, the Texas Brigade abandoned its camp at Falling Creek and marched toward Petersburg. The men reached Petersburg on April 4, and bivouacked there for several days. On April 8, Gen. Robertson resumed the march southward. The brigade passed through Jerusalem and crossed the Blackwater River on a pontoon bridge at Franklin, 20 miles west of Suffolk. (A temporary depot was established at Franklin for storage of excessive personal equipment and supplies.) On the march, the men were harassed by Federal cavalry patrols and then by infantry skirmishers as they approached Suffolk. Hood's Division reached Suffolk on April 11, and immediately entrenched on the west bank of the Nansemond River, north of the town. 

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Suffolk was well fortified and occupied by 25,000 to 30,000 troops under Federal commander, Maj. Gen. John J. Peck. A flotilla of Union gunboats patrolled the Nansemond. Longstreet's 20,000 men entrenched along a 15-mile line around the town, from the Nansemond in the north to the Great Dismal Swamp in the south. Hood's Division occupied the left or northern wing. Law's Brigade and the Texas Brigade occupied the leftmost positions near the Nansemond. The commander of Co. G, Fourth Texas, reported that his unit was ``engaged in action with 3 gunboats on the Nansemond River on the 14th and 15th of April.'' With his left flank vulnerable to attack, Longstreet ordered Hood to ``burn and destroy all of the wharves and landings on the Nansemond and also on the James that [he could] reach.'' Given their proximity to these areas, the job probably was done by Law's and Robertson's Brigades. 

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To protect his vulnerable flank, Gen. Robertson formed a special battalion of Texas sharpshooters under the command of the popular and charismatic Captain Ike Turner of Co. K, Fifth Texas. At 22 years old, Turner was the youngest captain in the Texas Brigade, and one of the most promising. On April 14, Turner was hit by a Federal sharpshooter while standing atop the parapet of Fort Huger, a Confederate fortification on Hill's Point close to the confluence of the Western Branch and the Nansemond. He died the next morning. His death was lamented by the whole brigade, particularly by Gen. Hood. 

In response to the Turner tragedy, an unknown member of the Fourth Texas swam the river toward the tall grass on the opposite bank that concealed the Yankee sharpshooters. After reaching the bank with a box of matches elevated over his head, the Texan ignited the bulrushes and drove out the sharpshooters. He then swam back to the Confederate bank completely unharmed. John W. Gordon of Co. C, Second North Carolina Cavalry wrote that the Yankees were driven away ``by the most daring deed [he had] ever witnessed.'' He also wrote, ``If ever a man deserved promotion for gallantry and a niche in the Temple of Fame, this Texan did.'' Unfortunately, this Fourth Texan's name is lost to history. 

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On April 19, a successful Federal assault was made against Fort Huger. The Texas Brigade was alerted for a night assault to recapture the fort and moved via Norfleet's House to the area. Reconnaissance by Gen. Hood and others soon showed that the undertaking was not worth the cost and confusion of a night assault. By the morning of April 20, the Federals had abandoned the fort, taking with them five guns, seven officers, and 130 men as prisoners. 

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The Confederate entrenchments around Suffolk were the most extensive and sophisticated yet seen in the Civil War. Three to five parallel lines of formidable works were formed. Rifle pits extended to within 200 yards of the Federal works. These advanced positions were manned by volunteers, since the no man's land between the lines was dominated by Federal sharpshooters. The primary purpose of these riflemen was to harass the enemy's artillery crews and force their sharpshooters under cover. J. M. Polk of Co. I, Fourth Texas, volunteered twice for duty in the rifle pits, but after losing part of his hat brim on one occasion and the top of his tight ear on another to Yankee sharpshooters, he decided to do only what he ``was ordered to do after that.'' 

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Throughout the siege of Suffolk, Longstreet impressed the men of Hood's and Pickett's Divisions into the service of foraging. This operation, conducted in the Tidewater region along the Virginia and North Carolina border, was the largest embarked upon by the South during the entire war. Scouring the regions east of the Blackwater and Chowan Rivers, the Confederates not only gathered food and other items essential for the sustenance of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, but also denied the occupying Federals the fruits of the surrounding territory. To haul the supplies back to the Rappahannock, Longstreet's men were forced to confiscate both food, wagons, and horses from area farmers. The men had little sympathy for the locals, as many of them had hitherto been profitting handsomely by overcharging both Confederate and Federal troops for their produce. 

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The procurement program was called to an abrupt halt on April 30, when Adj. Gen. Samuel Cooper ordered Longstreet to move his command ``without delay'' and to ``effect a junction with General Lee.'' This terse order was prompted by a southward advance by the Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. Union General Joe Hooker's spring offensive was underway. With much of his force scattered throughout the Tidewater region, Longstreet had to inform Cooper of an inevitable delay in getting his command mobilized. It was necessary to withdraw the forage trains before the troops left the Suffolk area, lest the trains fall into Federal hands. Lee would have fight without Longstreet, Hood, and Pickett in the impending campaign.

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By May 2, all the Confederate forage wagons had been sent north of the Blackwater River. Gen. Longstreet issued orders to his commanders to leave the Suffolk area and proceed without delay to rejoin the main body of the army near Fredericksburg. Hood's Division -- the last to leave the Suffolk trenches -- was ordered to march west on the Blackwater road after dark on May 3. After crossing the Blackwater, Hood's men dismantled the pontoon bridge at Franklin to slow the advance of the pursuing Federals. The Texas Brigade assumed its usual position as the rear guard of Longstreet's command. During the morning of May 4, Gen. Robertson's men skirmished with the lead elements of the Federal troops in pursuit. On May 5, the brigade continued north to Ivor Station on the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad, and boarded the cars for Petersburg and Richmond. 

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By the time Longstreet's command had left the Blackwater region, Gen. Lee had fought and won the Battle of Chancellorsville. As Longstreet's presence was no longer urgently needed, Lee ordered Longstreet on May 7 to proceed north at a normal marching pace. The Texas Brigade reached Richmond on May 8, and was given a handkerchief-waving welcome by the ladies of the capital city. From Richmond, the brigade headed northward through Frederick Hall and Louisa Court House, reaching Orange Court House on May 16. The brigade then marched to the vicinity of Somerville and Raccoon fords on the Rapidan River and went into camp. The campsite was about a mile west of the river in a large grove of chestnut trees on a range of low hills. Despite not having tents, the men were quite satisfied with their new camp. Here the Texans and the rest of the army reaped the rewards of their vast haul of food and supplies from the Suffolk campaign.

 

During the early weeks of May, the Confederate high command was urged by Gen. Longstreet to mount the Texas Brigade. The efficiency of Hood's men in procuring and impressing horses during the Suffolk campaign had convinced Longstreet that the continuation of such service would well benefit Lee's army. The Texas regiments buzzed with excitement over the prospect, especially after several companies of the Third Arkansas received mounts on May 6 or 7. This excitement, though, was tempered by the news on May 10 that Gen. ``Stonewall'' Jackson had succumbed to pneumonia contracted after his severe wounding by friendly fire near the end of battle at Chancellorsville. To fill the enormous void left in his high command, Lee again reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia by appointing Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell as commander of Jackson's Second Corps and by creating a Third Corps under the command of Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill. This reorganization did not affect the Texas Brigade, which remained in Longstreet's First Corps. 

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On May 26, Gen. Hood ordered a review of his division before the civilians of the surrounding countryside. The review was held in a clearing a mile from Hood's headquarters. Hood's seasoned brigades marched by a cheering public in the following order: Anderson's, Law's, Robertson's (Texas Brigade), and Benning's. Dan Collins' band from the Fourth Texas was part of the ensemble that played the marching tunes for the troops as they passed by Hood and his staff. Major M. W. Henry's artillery battery added realism to the spectacle by firing blank charges. After the formal review, Hood's brigades were ordered to fix bayonets, sound the rebel yell, and charge the cheering spectators. Pvt. John C. West, who had just joined Co. E of the Fourth Texas, wrote home, ``Sure enough I heard and joined in the regular Texas war hoop.'' He also wrote, ``One day's observation has led me to believe that no army on earth can whip these men. They may be cut to pieces and killed, but routed and whipped, never.'' 

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The Texans spent the remainder of the month cleaning their rifles, foraging for chickens, and picketing along the Rapidan. On May 28, several men from Cos. E and F of the Fourth Texas cut willow branches and headed for Raccoon Ford to supplement their locally procured chickens with a fish or two. Squads of men spent their day on the river fishing, playing poker, swimming and bathing, and washing their ``rags.'' They took full advantage of this leisure time along the Rapidan; they knew that, as summer drew near, opportunities like this would soon be few. 

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The two weeks of relaxation ended on May 31, when Gen. Robertson received orders to move the Texas Brigade in the direction of Fredericksburg. That day, the brigade marched 14 miles though thick dust, went into bivouac, stacked arms, and remained on alert through the night.

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On June 1, Gen. Robertson received orders to return to return to the brigade's camp near Raccoon Ford. Whether this aborted movement was a response to a Federal feint at crossing the Rappahannock or merely a training maneuver is not clear. Whatever the reason, the 28-mile forced march with full packs though choking dust under the hot sun was trying on recruit John C. West of the Fourth Texas. West later complained that he was ``pretty tired and [his] feet [were] very much blistered.'' 

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On June 3, Gen. Lee commenced his second great invasion of the North by withdrawing his army from the Rapidan-Rappahannock line and moving it toward the Shenandoah Valley. The Texas Brigade received orders to cook three days' rations and be prepared to move to Culpeper Court House by the next morning. Robertson's men waded across the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford early on June 4, marched 15 miles, and went into camp one mile south of Culpeper. 

On June 5, Union cavalry commander Gen. John Buford reported to Maj. Gen. Joe Hooker that he had received reliable information that ``800 Texans from Hood's command have been recently mounted on horses from Richmond.'' By June 8, the growing rumor that ``Lee has mounted the whole of Hood's infantry division'' was sent to Washington by Gen. Robert H. Milroy, commander of the Federal forces at Winchester. Although the prospect struck fear in the hearts of their enemies, the Texas Brigade's hopes of being mounted never materialized. Their destiny as foot soldiers became plain on June 1, when the few mounted companies of the Third Arkansas had their cherished horses taken away and given to the artillery. 

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On June 6, the Texas Brigade received orders to pack up and march by noon. At 1 pm, the men left their camp near Culpeper and headed northeast in a driving rain toward Rappahannock Station. The Texans and Arkansans slogged through mud until 10 pm, when, exhausted and wet, they bivouacked by the side of the road. At dawn on June 7, the brigade ate a cold and soggy breakfast from their haversacks, formed ranks, and marched back over the muddy roads to their Culpeper campsite. Lee had used Longstreet's brigades to feign a movement east of the Blue Ridge Mountains toward Washington and screen the Second Corps' movement toward the Shenandoah Valley. 

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On June 8, cavalry brigade commander Gen. Fitzhugh Lee invited Gen. Hood ``to bring any of [his] people'' to attend a grand review of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry command at Brandy Station. Although Lee probably intended for Hood to bring only his staff, Hood went to the affair accompanied by his whole division. Fearful that Hood's Texans might use the occasion to mock the cavalrymen as they paraded by, Lee warned Hood not to allow his men to yell, ``Here's your mule!'' Gen. Wade Hampton also warned Hood that his command would charge any disrespectful Texans. Exercising unprecedented restraint, the Texans behaved like gentlemen throughout the dandy occasion. 

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The next day, June 9, Stuart's cavalry was surprised by a Federal reconnaissance in force under Union Gen. Alfred Pleasanton. The ensuing Battle of Brandy Station was the largest cavalry battle ever fought in North America. When it was learned that Union infantry were supporting the cavalry, the Texas Brigade was started toward the battlefront. By the time the Texans arrived, however, the Federals had withdrawn back across the Rappahannock. Although he left the field to Stuart, Pleasanton had accomplished his mission by discovering that the Army of Northern Virginia was heading north. 

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On June 13, the Texas Brigade received orders to move from Culpeper. This action began a general northward movement by Longstreet's Corps east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. This movement was designed to protect the passes of the Blue Ridge as Richard Ewell's and A. P. Hill's Corps marched up the Shenandoah Valley and into Maryland. Longstreet's movement also served to confuse the Army of the Potomac (now concentrated at Centreville) as to Lee's true objective -- Washington or Pennsylvania. The Texas Brigade marched five miles west of Culpeper and bivouacked on the now familiar Cedar Mountain battlefield. Several men took to opportunity to walk over the battlefield. According to John C. West of Co. E, Fourth Texas, 

There were a great many unburied skeletons, presenting a very ghastly appearance. There were 49 skulls in one little ditch the bodies were torn to pieces and scattered about, having been taken from their shallow graves by hogs and other animals. A hand or foot might be seen protruding from the earth here and there...

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On June 15, the Texas Brigade marched north from its Cedar Mountain camp toward Ashby's Gap. It was a hot, sticky march conducted, as Pvt. West said, ``by that unmerciful driver, our beloved General Hood, who simply strikes up a trot and is satisfied that the Texas Brigade at least will camp with him at nightfall.'' Hood's Division marched 25 miles that day to Gaines' Cross Roads, but hundreds of men fell by the wayside as victims of exhaustion and sunstroke. A few died. 

On June 16, the brigade marched another 20 miles to Markham Station on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The next day, the march continued for another 14 miles until the the men were ordered to stop for the night about a mile from Upperville. On June 18, the Texas Brigade passed through the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap, crossed to the west side of the Shenandoah, and bivouacked near Millwood. The Shenandoah was deep and cold, and the Texans had to carry their rifles and cartridge boxes above their heads during the precarious crossing. The next day, the brigade moved north along the river to Berryville, crossed to the east side of the Shenandoah, and occupied a position on a mountain near Snicker's Gap. Robertson's command quickly constructed stone breastworks and remained on the windy, cloud-enshrouded mountaintop for three days. On June 23, the brigade withdrew from the mountain, crossed the Shenandoah yet again, and returned to its camp near Millwood. 

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On June 24, The Texas Brigade marched north from Millwood, passing through Berryville and Martinsburg. Reaching Williamsport in the rain about noon on June 26, the brigade crossed the Potomac into Maryland. With the pontoon bridge clogged with artillery and wagons, most the the men removed their clothes, held their guns and accoutrements aloft, and invaded the north in a semi-naked state to the patriotic tunes of the brigade's regimental bands. After the whole brigade had crossed the river, Gen. Robertson marched the men a short distance into Maryland, had them stack rifles, and permitted them to cook their rations. The Texans were in high spirits, and were looking forward to sampling the bounty of Northern territory. 

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During this break for lunch, each Texan was rewarded by Gen. Hood with one gill of whiskey from several barrels recently confiscated near Hagerstown. (A gill is one-quarter of a pint.) Those men who did not drink passed their ration to a more thirsty messmate. The combination of whiskey, empty stomachs, and the excitement of being in Yankeedom proved disastrous. Hood's order of one gill per man was often ignored. Pvt. J. M. Polk of Co. I, Fourth Texas, saw several of the barrels rolled out on a hill, the heads knocked out, and the whiskey ``issued to the men by the cupful.'' Polk added, ``I don't suppose the oldest man living in America ever saw so many men drunk at any one time.'' J. B. Polley of the Fourth Texas wrote that the amount of whiskey ``was amply sufficient to put fully half the Brigade not only in a boisterously good humor, but in such physical condition that the breadth of the road over which they marched that evening was more of an obstacle to rapid progress than its length.'' John C. West recalled that one-third of the men ``got pretty tight and that many of them slipped down and rolled in the mud.'' 

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When some semblance of order was restored, the Texas Brigade straggled across the narrow neck of Maryland to the vicinity of Greencastle, Pennsylvania. That day, June 26, 1863, Hood's men performed a feat never again matched by any division in the war. They had breakfast in Virginia, lunch in Maryland, supper in Pennsylvania, and slept in a state of intoxication -- four states in 24 hours. That evening the Hood's Division went into camp near Greencastle. Hood himself precipitated some of the most intense foraging yet done by the Texas Brigade when he reportedly said to his headquarter's guard, ``Boys, you are now on the enemy's soil; stack your arms and pretty much do as you please...stay close by and prevent any stranger from coming here to kill me, and establish your camp here by my tent.'' 

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The next morning, June 27, the Texans resumed their march north, passing through Greencastle up the Cumberland Valley toward Chambersburg. The country was beautiful, the roads macadamized, and the buildings impressive. John C. West wrote home that he had ``not seen a barn in the last three days but what was more substantially and carefully built and fitted out than any house...in the country of Texas. The barns were positively more tastily bult than two-thirds of the houses in Waco.'' The brigade entered Chambersburg that afternoon. Lt. Col. James Freemantle, a British observer who accompanied Gen. Lee into Pennsylvania, commented in his diary that ``Hood's Ragged Jacks'' were a ``queer lot to look at. They carry less than other troops...many of them have only got an old piece of carpet or rug as baggage; many have discarded their shoes in the mud; all are ragged and dirty, but full of good humor and confidence in themselves...'' 

As the men passed through the streets of Chambersburg, many of the townsfolk wore patriotic banners and made derisive remarks about the ragged Confederates. One woman wore a large American flag draped across her ample bosom until a Texan hollered out, ``Take care, Madam, for Hood's boys are great at storming breastworks when the Yankee colors is on them!'' Lt. Col. Freemantle noted that the women beat a ``precipitate retreat.'' 

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After passing through Chambersburg, the Texas Brigade camped in a grove of trees about a mile north of town. Here they rested and foraged until June 30. The foraging was largely in violation of Lee's General Order No. 73, dated June 27, which warned the men to abstain from wanton injury to private property and non-combatants. Lee also ordered that all confiscated goods were to be paid for in Confederate promissory notes or script. This order was also frequently ignored by the Texans, who took full advantage of the bountiful and prosperous area around Chambersburg to supplement their meager rations. 

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On June 29, the Fourth Texas superpassed the Fifth Texas' grand reputation for unauthorized procurement by executing one of the greatest foraging operations of the war. In one evening, the ``Hell Roaring Fourth'' had stripped a sizeable sector of the Cumberland Valley. When J. B. Polley awoke the next morning, he witnessed ``a wonderful and marvelous sight:'' 

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Every square foot of an acre of ground not occupied by a sleeping or standing soldier was covered with choice food for the hungry. Chickens, turkeys, ducks and geese squawked, gobbled, cackled, quacked and hissed in harmonious unison as deft and energetic hands seized them for slaughter and, scarcely waiting for them to die, sent their feathers flying in all directions. Scattered around in bewildering confusion and gratifying profusion appeared immense loaves of bread and chunks of corned beef, hams, and sides of bacon, cheeses, crocks of applebutter, jelly, jams, pickles, and preserves, bowls of yellow butter, demijohns of buttermilk, and other eatables too numerous to mention.

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Polley noted that the those whose were still sleeping were the foragers of the night before, while those standing were the men who had remained in camp as guards. Polley described the comic sight: 

Jack Sutherland's head pillowed itself on a loaf of bread, and one arm was wound caressingly half-around a juicy-looking ham. Bob Murray, fearful that his captives would take to their wings or be purloined, had wound a string, which bound half a dozen frying chickens around his right big toe; one of Brahan's wide-spread legs was embraced by two over-lapping crocks of apple-butter and jam, while a tough old gander, gray with age, squawked noisily at his head without in the least disturbing his slumber, Dick Skinner lay flat on his back -- with his right hand holding to the legs of three fat chickens and a duck, and his left, to those of a large turkey -- fast asleep and snoring in a rasping bass that chimed in well with the music of the fowls.

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According to Polley, ``The daylight hours of June 30 were devoted exclusively to gormandizing until at 3 p.m. marching orders came and leaving more provisions than carried, the Texans moved lazily...into line'' -- bound for Cashtown and Gettysburg. Hood's Division left the Chambersburg area in the wake of Gen. Lafayette McLaws' Division. The Texas Brigade reached Fayetteville that evening and there went into bivouac.

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Early in the morning of July 1, the Texas Brigade left its bivouac at Fayettesville and resumed its march along the Chambersburg Pike toward Cashtown, which lay 12 miles to the east. The movement of Longstreet's column was delayed several hours when Gen. Edward Johnson's Division of Ewell's Second Corps cut across its line of march. (Johnson's Division was ordered from Carlisle to Cashtown while Ewell's other divisions under Robert Rodes and Jubal Early advanced on Gettysburg directly.) J. B. Polley of the Fourth Texas wrote that the column would advance ``a hundred yards or so, and then stop and stand still, [the men] not daring to sit down, for five, ten, or twenty minutes at a time.'' 

The Texas Brigade finally reached Cashtown at 2 am on July 2. There the men were permitted to stack arms and rest. Word of the Confederate victory on July 1 in the fields north and west of Gettysburg must have reached them by this time. The men had rested but two hours when they received orders to resume their march toward Gettysburg, which was 8 miles further east along the pike. The Texas Brigade reached Gen. Lee's headquarters, just west of the town and south of the pike, an hour after sunrise of July 2. After a short delay, the Texans moved about a mile southwest to the valley of Willoughby Run behind Seminary Ridge. Here the brigade cooked breakfast and rested. 

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Those Texans who remained awake after their all-night march witnessed an historic gathering of Generals Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Hood. During this meeting, Lee outlined his plan for attacking the Federal Army of the Potomac, which was now under the command of Maj. Gen. George Meade. The Federals had been beaten back in the previous day's fight, but had assumed a strong defensive position on Cemetery Ridge, Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, south and east of Gettysburg. Lee wanted an echelon attack against the Federal left flank by Hood's and McLaws' Divisions of Longstreet's Corps and by Richard Anderson's Division of A. P. Hill's Corps. Longstreet opposed Lee's plan and advocated maneuvering around the Federal right flank, placing the Army of Northern Virginia between the Army of the Potomac and Baltimore, and receiving a Federal attack on ground of their own choosing. Lee viewed Longstreet's plan as impractical and risky, and ordered the attack against the Federal left to begin as soon as practicable. Lee then left Seminary Ridge to confer with Ewell, whom Lee wished to create a diversion against the Federal right on Cemetery and Culp's Hills. It was about 9 am. 

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Longstreet, reluctant to launch an attack without Pickett's Division (which had not yet arrived from Cashtown) or Law's Brigade (which was guarding the Confederate rear at New Guilford in the Cumberland Valley), delayed some three hours before beginning to deploy his corps on the Confederate right. When Law's Brigade rejoined the corps about noon, Longstreet started McLaws' and Hood's Divisions south toward their destinations near the Wheatfield and the Emmitsburg Road. McLaws' Division, which was positioned in the woods along Herr's Ridge, led the way. After marching a short distance along Black Horse Tavern Road, McLaws realized that his column was exposed to the view of a Federal signal station posted on the crest of Little Round Top, located about two miles to the east. After consulting Longstreet, McLaws ordered a countermarch back to Herr's Ridge, from which an alternate approach could be launched. By this time, Hood's van had overlapped McLaws' rear. Instead of allowing Hood to assume the lead, Longstreet gave in to McLaws' protests and allowed him to countermarch past Hood. This complication only served to delay further Lee's planned attack. 

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McLaws led his Division east to the Fairfield Road and then south along a road paralleling Willoughby Run. Angered by the slowness of the march, Longstreet ultimately ordered Hood to double the column alongside McLaws and go into position. Hood quickly responded and soon had his division on the Confederate right in search of the enemy's left flank. The Texas Brigade led the way, following their advance party of scouts and pioneers. 

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By 4 pm, McLaws and Hood finally had their divisions in place for the attack. Hood's Division deployed in two lines of two brigades astride the Emmitsburg Road about 2 3/4 miles south of the Lutheran Seminary. The Texas Brigade was on the left of the forward line and Law's Brigade was on its right. From left to right were deployed the Third Arkansas, First Texas, Fourth Texas, and Fifth Texas. Despite efforts to conceal their arrival, a hail of hot iron from Federal batteries in the Peach Orchard and Devil's Den made it plain that the Federal's knew their position. 

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Soon after reaching his assigned position, Hood received word from Law's scouts that the Federal left flank extended no further south than the Round Tops. Hood was convinced that turning the Round Tops would permit an easy attack of the enemy's rear. He petitioned Longstreet via courier to allow him to make the maneuver, but Longstreet denied the request by quoting Gen. Lee's orders to advance up the Emmitsburg Road. Hood petitioned twice more -- the last time in person -- further stating that the rocky terrain to his front precluded an unbroken advance on the enemy position. Hood's petitions were each denied by Longstreet, and Hood formally protested the attack. 

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By this time, the Federal artillery was taken its toll on Hood's idle brigades. Gen. Robertson had ordered the Texas Brigade to move to a less vulnerable position and lie down to minimize casualties. With deadly accuracy, a shell burst in the midst of the Fourth Texas, killing or wounding 15 men. John C. West of Co. E and several of his comrades were spattered with blood when a solid shot decapitated a soldier and cut another in two a few feet from them. West wrote, ``the infernal machines came tearing and whirring through the ranks with a most demoralizing tendency.'' 

Captain P. J. Barziza of Co. C, Fourth Texas wrote: 

The enemy's shells screamed and bursted around us, inflicting considerable damage. It is very trying upon men to remain still and in ranks under a severe cannonading. One has time to reflect upon the danger, and there being no wild excitement as in a charge, he is more reminded of the utter helplessness of his present condition. The men are all flat on the ground, keeping their places in the ranks, and as a shell is heard, generally try to sink themselves into the earth. Nearly every face is overspread with a serious, thoughtful air; and what thoughts, vivid and burning, come trooping up from the inner chambers of memory, the soldier can only realize.

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While they waited, Lt. Mat Beasley of Co. I, Fourth Texas learned that he was to command his company during the upcoming assault. This company had developed a reputation for losing officers in battle. His men consoled him over his unenviable position, but Beasley would later have the distinction of being the only commander of Co. I to survive a fight. 

Having received his orders from Longstreet to execute Lee's plan, Hood ordered his brigades to attack. It was just after 4 pm. Hood, on horseback in front of the Texas Brigade, commanded, ``Forward-Steady-Forward!'' Hood ordered Robertson to keep his brigade in contact with the Emmitsburg Road on the left and Law's Brigade on its right. Law's Alabamians, who received a head start in the attack, soon outpaced the Texas Brigade, and Robertson's men had to break into a trot just to keep contact on their right. Robertson quickly realized that he would have to violate Hood's order by either losing contact with the Law or the road. Robertson and Col. Van Manning of the Third Arkansas opted to break from the road rather than split the division. 

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Because of the rapid advance and the heat of the day, many of the Texans discarded their knapsacks, blankets, and other cumbersome non-essential battle equipment during the charge. John C. West of the Fourth Texas threw away everything except his socks, a flannel shirt, his gun, and his cartridge box. 

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Soon after crossing the Emmitsburg Road, Hood left Robertson and rode to the center of the division. While there, a shell exploded above his head, and one of its fragments tore into his left arm. Hood reeled in the saddle from shock, and his staff and comrades lowered him to the ground. Stretcher bearers carried him from the fight that had barely begun. Col. Evander Law then assumed command of Hood's Division. 

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As the Texas Brigade continued its advance across open fields into woods and rocky terrain, a large gap developed between the First and Fourth Texas. As Robertson tried to close the gap, Federal fire from woods on the left forced the Third Arkansas and the First Texas to veer further left to answer the attack. Unable to close the gap from the left, Robertson sent a staff officer to order the Fourth and Fifth Texas to close from the right. The regiments could not be found. Fortunately, the breach in the brigade was not exploited by the Federals and was soon plugged by the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama, which had been diverted from Law's right to silence Capt. James Smith's Fourth New York Battery firing from Devil's Den. Except for Co. I of the Fourth Texas (which had drifted left along with the First Texas), the Fourth and Fifth Texas now effectively fought as part of Law's Brigade. 

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The Fourth and Fifth Texas advanced by the Bushman and Slyder farmyards, splashed through Plum Run, and entered the woods on the western slope of Big Round Top. As the Fourth Texas advanced toward a stone wall, riflemen from the Second U.S. Sharpshooters posted behind it poured a detructive fire into the regiment's flank. Here, Lt. Joe C. Smith was killed, and Col. John C. G. Key and Lt. Col. Benjamin F. Carter (the former captain of Co. B) were wounded. Carter died a few days later in Federal hands. To the Fourth's right, the Fifth Texas and Fourth Alabama cleared the sharpshooters from the wall and drove them back. The three regiments then pressed on through thick woods and boulders to the saddle between the Big and Little Round Tops. 

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When the Fourth Texas passed to the east of Devil's Den, the men on its left could see the fight for Smith's Battery being waged. Cpl. Miles V. Smith of Co. D assembled several of his fellow Fourth Texans and sniped at the cannoneers from the boulders on Big Round Top. Smith was rewarded by the sight of the First Texas and the Twentieth Georgia of Benning's Brigade capturing the battery. When Federal troops attempted to recapture the guns, Smith's detail fired into the Federal flank. When the fight ended, he found the Fourth Texas halfway up the slope of Little Round Top. 

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When the Fourth Alabama and the Fourth and Fifth Texas emerged from the saddle between the Round Tops, they were staggered by the sight of Little Round Top's rocky slope directly to their front. The skirmishers and sharpshooters they had just expelled were scrambling up the rocky slope to join a well entrenched line of 1,000 men in Col. Strong Vincent's Brigade of the Union Fifth Corps. The three regiments dressed their line and advanced up the slope in pursuit. Col. Robert Powell of the Fifth Texas wrote that the ``ascent was so difficult as to forbid the use of arms.'' Large boulders forced the Texans to break ranks and file through them. On the left, the Fourth Texas went in yelling and whooping. John C. West wrote, ``Round the rude rock the ragged rascal ran.'' A ledge of large boulders and a hail of Federal lead stopped the advance. At this time, Col. Powell and Lt. Col. King Bryan of the Fifth Texas went down wounded. 

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The two Texas regiments retreated back down the slope of Little Round Top. Ordered forward, they advanced a second time. By this point, the Texas and Alabama regiments were attacking in only loose coordination at best. With most of their company officers dead or wounded, the men attacked through the boulders as squads instead of regiments. Men were everywhere trying to take cover behind the boulders. Inevitably, the second assault ended just as the first. Joined by the Fourty-eighth Alabama on their left, the Fourth and Fifth Texas attempted a third assault. With darkness falling over the field, it was now or never. 

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As the Texans and Alabamians advanced, the Sixteenth Michigan, on the right of Vincent's line, began to break. Vincent ordered the Forty-fourth New York to fire into the advancing Texans. Col. Stephen Weed also ordered the 140th New York to reinforce the wavering Michiganders. Bullets whizzed around so thickly that ``a man could hold out a hat and catch it full.'' Pvt. Val C. Giles of Co. B, Fourth Texas fired his rifle so many times that the ramrod became stuck in the barrel. He pounded the ramrod against a boulder and pulled the trigger, which sent the rifle flying from his hands, striking another Texan in the ear. The Federal fire ultimately was enough to stop the Confederate assault, but not before Co. K of the Fifth Texas came within 20 yards of the Union line. Finally, at someone's order the Texas regiments pulled back and reformed on the shoulder of Big Round Top southeast of Devil's Den. 

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As darkness descended, the noise of the battle faded into quiet. Night, however, brought little relief to the Texans wounded or stranded behind the boulders and in the crevices of Little Round Top. Scouting parties from both sides retrieved the wounded or captured prisoners. Federals and Confederates alike hastily built stone walls in anticipation of renewed battle in the morning. 

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At daylight on July 3, the scattered remnants of Robertson's Brigade were unified and occupied a sector along Plum Run between Devil's Den and Big Round Top. This would become part of the main Confederate defense line thoughout the day. While Lee was launching ``Pickett's Charge'' against the Union center, the Confederate right was relatively quiet. Sniper fire persisted throughout the day, and occasionally a shell would explode amidst the sparse ranks of the Texans. Federal cavalry twice appeared on the flank and rear of the Confederate right, but each time the horsemen were driven off by Law's artillery and infantry. The First Texas was the only regiment of the Texas Brigade engaged in these operations. Late in the afternoon, Hood's Division withdrew from its forward position to a line near the Emmitsburg Road. Here they remained through July 4, awaiting a Federal attack that never came. The Battle of Gettysburg was over. 

The Texas Brigade suffered the second highest brigade loss in Hood's Division -- 84 killed, 393 wounded, and 120 missing. Heavy casualties were suffered in the top officer ranks: Gen. Robertson, Cols. Manning, Key, and Powell, and Lt. Cols. King Bryan and Benjamin Carter were all wounded, the last fatally. 

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The Texas Brigade moved from its position just west of the Emmitsburg Road during the night of July 4. The march was slowed by heavy rains, high winds, and rutted roads. The brigade continued its retreat southwestward through Maryland, reaching Hagerstown late on the afternoon of July 6. There the Texans camped southeast of town on the Sharpsburg Road. The Texas Brigade rested in camp until July 10. John C. West wrote that during the first six days in July, he ``never took off [his] accouterments, night or day'' and was ``without meat and had little bread.'' 

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The heavy rains of the previous few days had partially detroyed the Confederate pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters and had rendered the Potomac at Williamsport unfordable. The Army of Northern Virginia formed a perimeter of defense around the crossing point, but the overcautious Meade left Lee's army unbothered while it rebuilt its pontoon bridge. Finally on the night of July 13 and the morning of July 14, Lee's army crossed safely into Virginia. Lee sat astride Traveller and watched the passage of his troops. As Hood's old brigade passed him at dawn on the 14th, ``each soldier bared his head. There was no salute, no cheer and no word was spoken as the men marched silently by.'' The Texas Brigade then marched eight miles to Martinsburg, where it bivouacked for the night. 

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On July 15, the Texas Brigade continued its march south through the Shenandoah Valley, tramping 12 miles to Darkesville. The next day the men reached Bunker Hill. Here they remained for four days. After finding several barrels of whiskey in a nearby haystack, the men of the Fifth Texas were heard singing a parody on ``Maryland, My Maryland:'' 

 

Old Bob Lee's heel is on thy shore,
Pennsylvane, My Pennsylvane;
His hand is at thy stable door,
Pennsylvane, My Pennsylvane.
You won't see you old hoss no more,
We'll ride him till his back is sore,
An' then come back and git some more,
Pennsylvane, My Pennsylvane.

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Robertson's command left Bunker Hill on July 20 and marched down the western bank of the Shenandoah, passing through Millwood on July 21. The brigade continued south through Stone Bridge and Cedarville, and, after a difficult crossing of both forks of the Shenandoah at Front Royal, bivouacked that evening near Chester Gap. On July 22, Texan scouts had a brush with Federal cavalry as they passed though the gap to the east side of the Blue Ridge. While crossing the gap, Capt. J. R. Woodward of the First Texas suddenly collapsed from a small bullet wound in his upper thigh. No one heard a shot or saw smoke. Woodward died a few days later, an apparent victim of a long-range sharpshooter. From Chester Gap the Texans marched directly south to Washington, Virginia, where they camped for the night. The Texas Brigade reached Culpeper Court House late on July 24, after a forced march of 27 miles. 

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The Texas brigade remained at Culpeper until July 31. Here they drew rations, supplies, and equipment, and wrote home of their great adventure into Pennsylvania. John C. West of the Fourth Texas wrote that he had not changed his clothes since the Battle of Gettysburg and that he had to throw away his undershirt as it ``had become a harbor of innumerable body lice.'' While at Culpeper, another member of the Fourth Texas was convicted of an offense for which he had to wear a ball and chain under guard. Some 25 members of the Fourth considered the punishment ``a disgrace to [the] regiment and the State of Texas'' and rushed the guard in an attempt to free the felon. Charges of mutiny were proferred against the 25 men, but later the charges were dropped ``through the influence of General Lee.'' Afterward no member of the Texas Brigade was ever recorded to have been punished with the ball and chain. 

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On July 31, Longstreet's Corps left Culpeper bound for Fredericksburg to counter a Federal move in that direction.

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On August 4, the Texas Brigade reached Rapidan Station after a leisurely march of 21 miles in four days. Word was then received that Gen. Meade was approaching the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, so the pace of Longstreet's march eastward quickened. Hood's Division marched from Rapidan Station to Fredericksburg, a distance of 32 miles, in 36 hours. The Texans arrived in Fredericksburg on August 6 only an hour before the advanced units of the Federal army appeared on the opposite bank of the Rappahannock. 

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The Texas Brigade remained in the vicinity of Fredericksburg for nearly a month, relaxing, drawing supplies, and guarding the fords of the Rappahannock. Hood's Division picketed a twelve mile stretch of the river between the United States Ford above Fredericksburg to a point a mile below the town. Expecting a lengthy stay, Gen. Robertson's command established a semi-permanent camp just below the town. The men ate well, were in fine spirits, and received new uniforms from the Richmond Depot and new shoes from England that had been run through the Union blockade. 

While in camp at Fredericksburg, many wild rumors circulated regarding the conditions in the army and back in Texas. Pvt. John C. West of the Fourth Texas wrote home that Gen. Hood had been promoted to lieutenant general of cavalry. This caused great excitement among the rank and file, as West said that ``Hood would endeavor to mount our brigade.'' Zack Landrum of the Fourth Texas wrote to his mother that ``a report was in circulation [in the army] that Texas and La. and Ark. had seceded from the Southern Confederacy and placed themselves under the protection from France.'' Landrum ``was in hopes that it was so, [for] when a nation can't protect the states that form it they [the states] ought to protect themselves in the best way they can. If it comes to the worst, I would rather the French should rule us than any nation on the globe.'' 

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While Hood's Division enjoyed relative peace on the right of Lee's line, Jeb Stuart's, A. P. Hill's and Ewell's commands up river were subjected to frequent attacks by Union cavalry and occasional sorties by infantry. One Texan, disgruntled by the lack of support given Longstreet's Corps at Gettysburg said ``Let em fight, let em fight. It's high time they were doin' it, durn 'em. If the cavalry had kept its place on our right and Hill's and Ewell's men had come halfway up to scratch over yonder at Gettysburg, we'd be feasting today on brotherly love at Philadelphia, or on terrapins and canvasback ducks in Baltimore instead of here in Old Virginia nibbling carefully at our rations lest they run short. Let 'em fight, it is not our funeral.''